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I COMMENTS I
Let's All Go To The Dairy Queen Without
Margo!: The Liability of Franchisors Under
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act After Neff v. American Dairy Queen
Corp.
I. Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act)1 was
intended to make the advantages of mainstream life available to
the estimated forty-three million Americans who suffer from
discrimination because of their disabilities.2 When President
George Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990, he hailed
it as the "world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for
people with disabilities."3
As a disabled person who uses a wheelchair to gain mobility,4
Margo Neff is presumably one of the forty-three million that the
ADA was intended to help. When architectural barriers denied
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
3. Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1990 PUB. PAPERS
1067, 1068 (July 26, 1990).
4. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1064 (5th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996).
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Ms. Neff access to her local Dairy Queen restaurant, she filed suit
against the franchisor, American Dairy Queen Corporation
(ADQ).5 She alleged that the franchisor was in violation of the
section of the ADA which requires that private entities provide
access to public accommodations to persons with disabilities (Title
III).6 She further alleged that the franchisor was liable for the
modifications necessary to allow her access.7 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the district court's granting
of ADQ's summary judgment motion.'
Neff was a test case on the liability of franchisors under Title
1II. As such, the decision will necessarily have a profound impact
on the ability of persons with disabilities to obtain Title III
compliance from franchised businesses. This Comment will
examine the basis used by the Fifth Circuit to determine the
liability of ADQ, other bases of franchisor liability which originated
in both the common law and other federal statutory schemes, the
repercussions of adopting various bases in analyzing the Title III
liability of franchisors, and ultimately the possibility of adopting an
analysis of franchisor liability unique to Title III. But, first, it is
necessary to briefly set forth the history of the ADA and the
background of franchising in the United States.
II. The History and Purpose of the ADA
The ADA was not the first federal legislation enacted for the
benefit of persons with disabilities; the Architectural Barriers Act
of 19681" provided for persons with disabilities to gain access to
buildings designed, constructed, or altered using federal funds;"
in addition, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197312 prohibited
discrimination against persons with disabilities by any program or
activity receiving federal funds." However, since these acts
covered only entities receiving federal funding, the relief they
provided was limited.
5. Id. (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (1988) (providing for remedy of injunctive relief)).
6. Id. at 1064 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Supp. 11 1990)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Jerry Laws, Franchisors Win ADA Test Case, TEX. LAW., Aug. 7, 1995, at 4
(providing a background on the Neffcase).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988).
11. Id.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
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In spite of this earlier legislation, Congress made the following
findings when it considered passage of the ADA and included them
in the Act: forty-three million Americans have a physical disability
and this number is increasing as the population as a whole grows
older;4 discrimination against persons with disabilities is a serious
and pervasive social problem; 5 persons with disabilities have been
without legal recourse to address the discrimination; 6 and this
discrimination has designated persons with disabilities an isolated
group, disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically and
educationally. 7 The purpose of the ADA, also set forth in the
Act, is to mandate the elimination of discrimination against persons
with disabilities,"8 to provide clear, strong, consistent and enforce-
able standards against such discrimination, 9 and to provide for
federal enforcement of such standards.2" While Titles I and II of
the Act deal with a protected individual's right to employment2'
and to public services and transportation,22 Title III deals with
rights to public accommodations and services operated by private
entities.'
The general rule of Title III provides: "No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (Supp. I 1990).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 111990). The ADA charges the U.S. Attorney
General with promulgation of regulations to implement the non-transportation provisions of
Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (Supp. 111990). Under mandate, the Department of Justice
has issued regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-.608 (1994), and a technical assistance manual,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL COVERING PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
FACILITIES (1993), issued under 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3) (Supp. II 1990). The Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice undertakes enforcement of ADA Title III. Telephone
Interview with Roberta Roque, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (Oct. 24,
1995). Regulations issued by the Department of Justice under Title II (Public Services) are
entitled to substantial deference. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir.) (citing
Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982)), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania Secretary of
Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995). Presumably, the Justice Department's
regulations under Title III would be entitled to the same deference.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. 11 1990).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (Supp. 111990).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. 11 1990).
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person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation. "24
"Public accommodations" are defined in twelve categories and
include, briefly, privately owned hotels, restaurants, movie theaters,
retail sales stores, schools and, generally, any places providing
consumer goods and services.2  "Discrimination" is defined, in
part, as the failure to make reasonable modifications in policies or
procedures to allow persons with disabilities to receive goods or
services (unless the modification would fundamentally alter the
nature of the goods or services or would be an undue burden) and
the failure to remove architectural or communications barriers
where readily achievable.26  "Readily achievable" is defined as
easily accomplished without much difficulty or expense.27 The
overall financial resources of the covered entity are to be consid-
ered in evaluating the level of expense.2' The inclusion or
exclusion of franchisors from the analysis of whether or not a
proposed modification in a franchised business is readily achievable
becomes important when a franchisee's assets are low.
2 9
III. The Origin, Development and Success of Franchising in the
United States
The concept of franchising originated in the post-World War
II period as a competitive response by local and national entrepre-
neurs to the chain store phenomenon." The federal trademark
statute, the Lanham Act,31 established the basis of franchising by
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (Supp. 111990) (emphasis added).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp. 11 1990).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). For a discussion of the undue burden
provision in Title I, see Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans With Disabilities Act,
48 VAND. L. REV. 391 (1995).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (Supp. 11 1990).
28. Id.
29. Telephone Interview with Robert Farr, of Heffernan, Farr, McChord & Morelli
(Oct. 27, 1995).
30. Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of State Franchising
Statute, 67 A.L.R.3d 1299, 1302 (1975).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994) (also known as the Trademark Act of 1946). A
trademark is a word or design used on goods or in connection with services which is used
to designate one source of goods from others in the marketplace. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL.,
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 27 (1991). The Lanham Act provides for
federal registration of trademarks, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994), and provides relief to owners
whose registered marks are infringed, used without permission, by another party. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114 (1994).
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permitting trademark owners to license independent parties to use
their marks and continues to be in effect today.32 Owners do not
lose rights in their marks, so long as they adequately control the
trademark use.33 With minimum capital and manpower, a local
entrepreneur can establish a business with nationwide name
recognition.34 Over the half century since passage of the Lanham
Act, the concept of franchising has grown increasingly more
complex and now typically also embraces mandating a business
format to be used in conjunction with the marks. 35 Franchised
businesses achieve success by creating among the public a percep-
tion of quality and uniformity in all of the franchise outlets.36 The
business format, usually detailed in an operating manual, helps
franchisees achieve the requisite levels of quality and uniformity."7
According to the International Franchise Association (IFA),
a private organization of franchisors and franchisees with over
27,000 members worldwide, 1992 U.S. sales from franchising
amounted to $803.2 billion and accounted for 40.9% of retail
sales. 38 IFA speculates that sales in the year 2000 could reach $1
trillion.39 Franchised businesses employ over 8 million people and
account for one out of every twelve businesses in the U.S.'
Business format franchises, as opposed to franchises marketing
the franchisor's product, account for nearly three quarters of the
total number of franchised businesses. 4 Among the business
categories in which business format franchises concentrate are
restaurants, hotels, business services, automotive services, automo-
tive rental services, convenience stores, construction and home
improvement, recreation and educational services and cleaning
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994); see generally Turner v. H M H Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1055. Courts routinely impose a duty on licensors to oversee trademark
use by licensees. Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th
Cir. 1977). Absence of control leads to abandonment of rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1055; see
Oberlin v. Marlin American Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (7th Cir. 1979).
34. Barbre, supra note 30, at 1302.
35. See, e.g., H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 493 P.2d 205, 211-12 (Kan. 1972).
36. See David J. Kaufmann, Vicarious Liability Topples Domino's, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 25,
1994, at 3.
37. Id.






services.42 Such businesses are precisely those that are covered by
the public accommodation provisions of the ADA.43
IV. The Decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Neff
v. American Dairy Queen Corp.'
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the question of franchisor
liability for accommodations under Title III of the ADA was one
of first impression.45 The plaintiff, Ms. Neff, argued that the lower
court's grant of ADQ's summary judgment motion was erroneous,
because the franchise agreement provided for ADQ's exercise of
pervasive control over the franchisee.46  Neff attempted to
persuade the court that such pervasive control should render the
franchisor and the franchisee co-operators, who should each be
jointly liable for the architectural modification of the premises.47
The theory of joint liability finds support in both the statute and in
regulations which allow landlords and tenants to be jointly liable
for any premises leased to a public accommodation.48
The Department of Justice (DOJ), appearing as amicus curiae,
supported the theory of franchise liability, arguing that the status
of "operator" under the ADA is a question of fact.49 Therefore,
the district court's ruling should have been reversed and the case
remanded for discovery on the issue of the control retained by
ADQ over the franchisee. The DOJ brief noted the Depart-
ment's position that any allocation of responsibility between the
franchisor and franchisee was enforceable only between the
parties.5" So far as the law was concerned, if ADQ was found to
be an operator, it and the franchisee were jointly and severally
liable.52
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
44. 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996).
45. Neff, 58 F.3d at 1066.
46. Appellant's Brief at 8 and 9, Neff (No. 94-50552).
47. Id. at 5.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994).
49. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Neff (No. 94-50552).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16 (citing in support 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (1994), which recognizes the
allocation of responsibility for ADA compliance between a landlord and tenant, and the
DOJ's The Americans with Disabilities Act Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering
Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities (Nov. 1993), which explains that allocation
is effective between the parties, but both remain fully liable).
52. Id.
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ADQ objected to the application of vicarious liability theory
to ADA statutory liability,53 but nevertheless argued that its
control over the franchisee was insufficient to find liability under
such theory.54 ADQ further argued that the common usage of the
word "operate" does not encompass the concept of franchising.55
The International Franchise Association (IFA)56 appeared as
amicus curiae on behalf of ADQ. The IFA echoed ADQ's
arguments and added that holding franchisors liable for ADA
compliance would create a disincentive on the part of franchisees
to comply with the Act.57 Further, the IFA argued, a holding of
franchisor liability under the ADA could have repercussions in
other statutes and areas of common law liability that could threaten
the survival of the franchising industry.5"
The Neff court affirmed the summary judgment grant for
ADQ.59 It rejected the theory that controls over aspects of the
franchisee's business other than designated architectural specifica-
tions could make ADQ an operator for purposes of liability to Ms.
Neff under Title 111.61 The court held that, in order for liability
to attach to the franchisor for Ms. Neff's claim, ADQ must have
specific control over the demanded modification.61
Counsel for Ms. Neff filed a petition for writ of certiorari for
review of the Fifth Circuit decision with the United States Supreme
Court on October 18, 1995.62 The Court denied certiorari on
January 8, 1996.63
The presence or absence of a provision on architectural
modifications in the franchising contract appears to be an easy test
53. Appellee's Brief at 24, Neff (No. 94-50552).
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 14.
56. See generally Section III.
57. Brief of the IFA as Amicus Curiae at 14, Neff (No. 94-50552).
58. Id. at 18.
59. Neff, 58 F.3d at 1070.
60. Id. at 1067.
61. Id. at 1066.
62. Telephone Interview with Pamela Breed Bonavita, Advocacy, Incorporated, counsel
for the petitioner Ms. Neff (Oct. 24, 1995).
63. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996). The denial of certiorari
was anticipated by counsel for ADQ, who stated shortly after the filing of the writ petition
that, even if the Supreme Court was amenable to the issue, the brevity of the record made
Neff a poor candidate for the grant of certiorari. Telephone Interview with Joseph M.
Harrison, of Haynes & Boone, counsel for the respondent American Dairy Queen Corp.
(Oct. 31, 1995).
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of franchisor liability to apply, but is it a fair test? In order to
answer this question, the following two sections survey the bases of
franchisor liability for franchises under the common law and under
federal remedial legislation other than the ADA.
V. Vicarious Liability of Franchisors under the Common Law64
According to the franchising industry, the basis underlying the
franchising arrangement is the theory that the franchisor and
franchisee are independent entities, bound only by a contractual
arrangement.65 Franchisors, therefore, should incur no liability to
third parties for any acts of their franchisees.
66
Although receptive to the franchising theory, courts have not
established concrete definitions of franchisor and franchisee 67 and
have, accordingly, refused to adopt per se rules rejecting franchisor
liability to third parties for acts of the franchisee.68 Instead, in
liability cases, courts typically analyze the true relationship between
the franchisor and franchisee.69 As the following discussion shows,
64. For an article focusing on this topic, see Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation,
Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81 A.L.R.3d 764 (1977).
65. Kaufmann, supra note 35, at 3.
66. Id.
67. The New Jersey court in Neptune T.V. & Appliance Service, Inc. v. Litton
Microwave Cooking Products Division, Litton Systems, Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 598 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1983) set forth the "two definitional criteria of a franchise... [as] a grant by
the alleged franchisor to the alleged franchisee of a license permitting [franchisee] to use the
franchisor's trade name ... [and] the sharing by both parties of a community of interest in
a business enterprise." The court further provided that, although "the franchise relationship
is akin to a partnership ... [t]hey are... not partners in the true sense of sharing profits and
losses." Id. at 600.
Whereas, the New York court in Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 70 F.R.D.
556, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) wrote, "a franchisee ... must perform according to the judgment,
rules, regulations, methods and guidelines of the franchisor. [Whereas], [t]he customary
independent contractor exercises his independent judgment and performs his contract
according to his own method and is not subject to the control of the other party to the
contract."
68. See Stanford v. Dairy Queen Products, 623 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tex. App. 1981)
(holding that there is no intrinsic reason why the relationship of "agency" or "representative"
could not arise in the franchise context); see also Singleton v. International Dairy Queen,
Inc., 332 A.2d 160, 163 (Del. Super. 1975) (holding that the label which the parties to the
franchise agreement give their relationship is not controlling in determining the franchisor's
liability); McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 321 A.2d 456,460 (Conn. 1973) (holding that
a franchise contract may help determine whether a franchisee is an agent as a matter of fact,
but is not determinative).
69. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 1978)
and Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa. 1975), afffd, 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
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the common law concepts of agency and ostensible agency have
been used to establish franchisor liability where the relationship is
found to be more than contractual.
"Agency" is a mutually beneficial agreement between two
parties where one, the agent, consents to act for the benefit and
under the control of another, the principal, who, in turn, consents
to the agent's acting on behalf of the principal.7' The franchisor's
normal policing of the franchisee's trademark use is insufficient to
create a principal-agent relationship.71 Likewise, quality control
over the goods or services marketed under the trademark is
typically safe72 and the receipt of royalty payments for trademark
use will not make the franchisor vulnerable to principal status.73
An agency relationship requires that the principal have the
right to control the work of the agent.74 Therefore, if a franchi-
sor's control reaches the point where it may fairly be described as
pervasive, excessive or equivalent to day-to-day control, a principal-
agent relationship may be found by the court.7" Establishment of
such a relationship is normally a matter of fact, rather than a
question of law.76  However, it is also possible that the terms of
a franchise agreement are so strict that the agency relationship is
70. McLaughlin, 321 A.2d at 459.
71. Oberlin v. Marlin American Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979).
72. Cislaw v. Southland Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
73. McGuire v. Radisson Hotels International, Inc., 435 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993); Whitco Produce Co., Inc. v. Bonanza International, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980); see also Cislaw, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395 (holding that the receipt of franchise fees did
not render the franchise relationship a partnership or a joint venture).
74. Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 634 A.2d 622, 626 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993);
Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); McLaughlin, 321
A.2d at 459.
75. See Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 626 (holding franchisee's use of the franchisor's
tradename and franchisee's participation in the franchisor's reservation network did not
constitute control of day-to-day operations); Little, 455 N.W.2d at 393 (holding franchisor's
rights to set standards for products and services, to regulate furnishings and advertising and
to inspect for compliance with the agreement is not control of day-to-day operations). But
see Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1993) (holding that the relevant inquiry
concerning the franchisor's liability for a service station attendant's injury during a robbery
did not constitute general control by the franchisor of day-to-day operations, but rather its
specific control over the service station's security).
The same control analysis typically appears in actions to pierce a corporate veil. See,
e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)("[A] court can
pierce the corporate veil of an entity where there is fraud[,] or where a subsidiary is in fact
a mere instrumentality or alter ego of its owner.").
76. McLaughlin, 321 A.2d at 459.
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created on the basis of the agreement alone.77 In applying the
control test, some courts have recently focused on the operating
manual that franchisors routinely provide to franchisees as evidence
of control.78
The operating manual is typically comprehensive, covering
virtually all important aspects of the franchisee's business opera-
tions.7 9 While some courts may view such detailed operating
provisions as the permissible quality control necessary to protect
the quality and uniformity of the business,8° in recent years others
have used the manual as evidence of control giving rise to vicarious
liability.
81
Franchisor liability may also arise if the franchisee is operating
as the franchisor's apparent agent. Even if the actual control is not
present, a customer's reasonable reliance on the apparent authority
of a franchisee may be sufficient to hold the franchisor liable.82
However, the customer must have reasonably expected that the
franchisor was responsible for the operation of the restaurant, not
just that the franchisor would be liable for injuries.
83
77. See Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (Va. 1975).
78. See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cause
dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Angrand v. Key, 657 So.
2d 1146, 1149 (Fla. 1995).
79. Kaufmann, supra note 36. Among the subjects normally covered are the following:
site selection, construction and "build out" requirements, the hiring and firing of
the franchisee's personnel, the systems of operation, procedures, standards, and
techniques which the franchisee must adhere to, recipes, product preparation
procedures and requirements, sources of supply, standards of maintenance and
appearance, advertising and public relations activities and materials, record-kee-
ping systems and materials, hours of operation, purchasing procedures, staffing
requirements, required and prohibited uses of the franchisor's name and marks,
insurance requirements, applicable licensing requirements, and required attire.
Id.
80. See, e.g., Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) 9732 (N.D. I11. 1990); see also McGuire v. Radisson Hotels International, Inc., 435
S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
81. See Shelburne, 576 So.2d at 332-33. Curiously, the failure to provide an operating
manual has been found also to give rise to liability without the court perceiving a need to
characterize it as direct liability for negligence or vicarious liability for the franchisee's
negligence. See O'Boyle v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 435 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981).
82. See Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988) (franchisee's notice
of status on a restaurant sign did not preclude a jury's finding the appearance of ownership
by the franchisor); see also Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160, 163
(Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
83. Opinions in the following cases recognize the possibility of liability from ostensible
agency, but deny that the evidence in each case was sufficient to hold the franchisor liable:
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Franchisors may obligate themselves by an affirmative
agreement to assume responsibility.84 When a franchisor imposes
an operating method on fianchisees, the policy may also give rise
to liability if the policy is seen to be responsible for the injury.85
Three years ago the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that Domino's Pizza, Inc., the franchisor, was liable for
a violation of civil rights laws for its no-beard policy which had a
disparate impact on African Americans.86
Domino's Pizza, Inc. has also been forced to withdraw its "30-
minute delivery" policy under the threat of liability for auto
accidents caused by franchisee-employed drivers.' The with-
drawal comes in the wake of Kinder v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. in
which a jury awarded not only $750,000 in actual damages but also
$78 million in punitive damages to a woman struck when a pizza
delivery van ran a red light.88 Thus, the Franchisor's policy gave
rise to liability to the woman injured as a result of the policy's
implementation.
VI. Franchisor Liability Under Federal Remedial Legislation
Other than the ADA
Federal courts recognize the ADA as remedial legislation.89
Therefore, in order to shed light on the appropriateness of holding
franchisors liable for Title III modifications, this section will
examine whether liability extends to franchisors under other federal
remedial legislation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a remedial statute,
prohibits discrimination by an employer on the basis of race, color,
religion or national origin.9" Remedial legislation, passed to cure
a perceived social ill, is to be interpreted liberally in accordance
McGuire, 435 S.E.2d at 53; Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 634 A.2d 622, 629 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990);
Schear v. Motel Management Corp., 487 A.2d 1240, 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
84. See Whitco Produce Co. v. Bonanza International, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 627,628 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1980) (stating in dicta that liability for franchisee's debts may be imposed on the
franchisor; if the franchisor "by some act or conduct obligated itself.").
85. See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1993).
86. Id.
87. Kaufaann, supra note 36.
88. No reported decision. The facts were obtained from Kaufmann, supra note 36.
89. Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1073 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Hoskins
v. Kinney, 114 S. Ct. 1545 (1994).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
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with and in order to accomplish its purpose.9 Thus, it is appropri-
ate to look to policy considerations to supplement legislation that
fails to offer clear guidance.92 However, words are to be given
their ordinary meaning93 and judicial construction is not to be
used to revise a statute.94 Despite the remedial nature of Title
VII, plaintiffs have had a difficult time convincing courts to accept
franchisors as employers for Title VII liability.9" In interpreting
franchisor liability for Title VII violations courts borrow the control
test from the common law of agency known as an "economic
realities" test.96 The economic realities test focuses, on a case-by-
case basis, on the entity to whom employees render service and on
whom employees are dependent for income.97
The lack of Title VII liability supports the conclusion that the
remedial nature of the ADA alone is insufficient to sweep
franchisors into the group of liable parties. However, such lack of
liability under Title VII does not establish that franchisors are not
liable under the ADA, nor that the economic realities test is an
appropriate one since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bases liability on
status as an employer,98 whereas the ADA bases liability on status
as an operator.99
Plaintiffs have also had difficulty in holding franchisors liable
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).'0 In 1978, a 15-
year-old girl sued Yankee Doodle House, Inc., the franchisor,
91. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
92. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
93. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
94. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986
(1987).
95. See Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1991); Wheeler, 825 F.2d
257; Kennedy v. McDonald's Corp., 610 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. W. Va. 1985). But see Bradley
v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
96. For decisions supporting the use of the control and "economic realities" tests in
determining franchisors' Title VII liability and finding franchisor control failed to reach the
employer level, see Evans, 936 F.2d at 1087; Wheeler, 825 F.2d 257; Kennedy, 610 F. Supp.
at 203. But see Bradley, 7 F.3d at 795 (Title VII action can be sustained against a franchisor
on the basis of a franchisor's operating policy). For a brief history of the "economic
realities" test, see Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 268 n.24.
97. Kennedy, 610 F. Supp. at 205.
98. The Neffcourt specifically held that cases under the Civil Rights Act are "unlikely
to be informative on the meaning of [operates]" for purposes of the ADA, because the Civil
Rights Act does not use that term to define liability. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp.,
58 F.3d 1063, 1070 (5th Cit. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
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under the FLSA for injuries suffered while operating a slicing
machine."' 1 Although the franchise agreement required that the
franchisee comply with federal law, and the franchisor was aware
of the franchisee's noncompliance, the court held that the franchi-
sor's right to terminate the franchise agreement was insufficient to
establish liability under either an agency or independent contractor
theory. 2
In Marshall v. Shan-An-Dan, Inc. 1 the Secretary of the
United States Department of Labor attempted to hold a franchisor,
Precision Transmission, Inc., accountable under the FLSA for back
wages owed to franchisee employees."' The court examined the
control exerted by the franchisor over the franchisee and deter-
mined that the limits placed on the franchisee were insufficient to
make the two a single entity under the FLSA" However, the
court noted specific provisions in the FLSA that eschewed the
liability of franchisors.1" These provisions are absent from the
ADA."° Moreover, the FLSA, like Title VII, places liability on
employers, rather than operators.t0
One plaintiff brought suit against a franchisor under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973."0 In 1980, a suit was filed against
Budget Rent-A-Car Corporation, the franchisor, for a franchisee's
101. Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., Inc., 373 N.E.2d 1371 (I11. App. Ct. 1978). The
FLSA and regulations under the FLSA restrict operation of dangerous machinery to
individuals over 18 years old. Id at 1374 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 201ff; 29 C.F.R., Part 1500,
Subpart E).
102. Coty, 373 N.E.2d at 1376.
103. 747 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1984).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1088.
106. According to the court, "a retail or services establishment which is under
independent ownership shall not be deemed to be so operated or controlled as to be other
than a separate and distinct enterprise by reason of any arrangement, which includes
[provisions of typical franchise agreements]." Id. at 1087 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1976)).
The court also noted the legislative history of the FLSA which stated in part, "[t]he
definition of 'enterprise' expressly makes it clear that a local retail or service establishment
which is under independent ownership shall not be considered to be so operated and
controlled as to be other than a separate enterprise because of a franchise, or group
purchasing, or group advertising arrangement.... " Id at 1088 (citing S. Rep. No. 145, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1660-62) (emphasis added by
the court).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The target group under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, those
receiving federal funds, makes the Rehabilitation Act little help in defining the ADA's target
group, "operators," but is useful in examining franchisor liability generally.
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failure to lease a car to a handicapped individual."' 0 The plaintiff,
Timothy Cook, based his claim on the fact that the franchisor
leased cars to the federal government.u The claim failed be-
cause the court held that lease payments were not a receipt of
federal funds as contemplated by the Rehabilitation Act."2
However, the opinion completely ignores all arguments against
franchisor liability based on the franchisor's contractual status as an
independent entity.13 The opinion would seem to support the
possibility of ADA liability for franchisors, especially since the case
law surrounding the Rehabilitation Act has been endorsed as
applicable to interpretation of Title II (Public Services) of the
ADA." 4 Unfortunately, since the opinion does not address itself
explicitly to the issue of franchisor liability, its precedential value
in determining ADA liability is questionable.
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act (BLBRA) provides for
payments to be paid to miners suffering from black lung dis-
ease." 5  Unlike Title VII and the FLSA, liability under the
BLBRA rests with any entity meeting the statutory definition of
"operator": "any owner, lessee, or other person who operates,
controls, or supervises a coal or other mine or any independent
contractor performing services or construction at such
mine .... ,6  In Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs,"7 the court interpreted the
foregoing definition. The court noted that the BLBRA was
amended in 1978 and, according to the legislative history, the
amendment was intended to prevent the use of corporate changes
to escape liability."8 The court went on to hold that a right of
control, always present in a corporate structure, rather than
exercised control, is the determinative factor in finding an entity to
110. Cook v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 502 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 502.
113. Id. at 494.
114. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Pennsylvania Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995).
115. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (1986).
116. 30 U.S.C. § 802(d) (1986).
117. 17 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1994).
118. Id. at 631 (referring to the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 901-962 (1988)).
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be an operator.n 9 This decision would seem to support a holding
of no liability for franchisors, like ADQ, that have no provision for
architectural control written into their franchising agreements.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 2° like the BLBRA and the ADA,
imposes liability for the cleanup of contaminated waste sites on,
inter alia, "operators.' 121  Unfortunately, like the ADA,
CERCLA fails to define the term. Courts have dealt with
numerous cases which attempt to pierce the corporate veil and hold
parent corporations liable for the violations of subsidiaries.122
Some decisions have held that the power to control, whether or not
utilized, is sufficient." These decisions would seem to support
the holding in Neff.24 Other decisions have steadfastly refused
to find liability unless the parent corporation exercised day-to-day
control over the subsidiary's business.2 5  Actual, pervasive
control of daily decisions is required.126  Therefore, an unexer-
cised ability to control is insufficient. 127  These decisions would
seem to support the arguments of Ms. Neff and the DOJ for a
factual inquiry into the amount of day-to-day control.
As an aside, the Jacksonville Elec Auth. v. Eppinger & Russell
Co.22 opinion mentions in a footnote that an exemption normally
available to secured creditors may be waived if the creditor
"participat[es] in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes."' 29  One could make the argument that the
impact of franchisors' operational controls and receipt of profits
influences a franchisee's willingness and ability to undertake
119. Id. at 638. Here the court found that the right of control was insufficient in leases
where the lessor retained only a right of reentry and a right to royalty payments.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9660a (Supp. V 1993).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
122. See, e.g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir.
1993); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger & Russell Co., 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla.
1991), affd, 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D. R.I. 1989), affd,
910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
124. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 704 (1996).
125. Id. at 1547.
126. Id.
127. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1221.
128. 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991), affd 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993).
129. Id. at 1547 n.5.
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modifications to comply with the ADA. If the franchisee did not
have to use some of its assets to make franchise payments to the
franchisor and to comply with the franchisor's operating instruc-
tions, those assets would be available in the analysis of readily
achievable modifications. Of course, a release of such obligations
could also result in an undermining of the franchise relationship.
Although the Black Lung Benefits Act and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act target
"operators" for liability, the subject matter of such legislation
makes the application of their jurisprudence to ADA interpretation
as questionable as the application of the other remedial jurispru-
dence surveyed. Nevertheless, an important theme emerges from
the survey: liability is imposed on those individuals who have
control, sometimes the right to control, sometimes actual control.
This theme is the same as the common law of agency surveyed in
section V of this Comment. With such widespread support,
application of the concept of control to ADA liability is a small
step. However, of the three cases that appear in the following
section, which concern the ADA Title III liability of franchisors,
only one has used a form of the control test.
VII. Survey of Other Franchisor Liability Cases Under Title III
In Staron v. McDonald's Corp." a group of three asthmatic
children and a lupus sufferer sued two restaurant franchisors,
McDonald's Corporation and Burger King Corporation. The
plaintiffs demanded that the franchisors prohibit smoking in all
their restaurants (franchised and company-owned) as a reasonable
modification under Title Ill.131 The trial court granted the
franchisors' motion to dismiss.'32 On appeal, however, the ruling
was reversed and remanded.'33 Further, the appellate court
refused McDonald's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot even
after it had announced a smoking ban in all of its company-owned
restaurants.134
130. 872 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Conn. 1994).
131. Id. at 1093.
132. Id. at 1094.
133. Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 355.
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At first blush the result would appear to be in conflict with the
result in Neff.135 However, the appellate decision dealt only with
the issue of whether a ban on smoking was a reasonable modifica-
tion. 36 The franchisor did not challenge its status as owner and
operator.'37 McDonald's is currently challenging on remand the
court's ruling on its status as owner and operator. 3 ' Although
McDonald's owns and leases the premises of McDonald's restau-
rants to its franchisees, McDonald's maintains that the smoking ban
is a policy question and that ownership of the buildings does not
establish control, and hence, liability for policy.'39
The issue of control did prove determinative in Aikins v. St.
Helena Hospital.14° The hearing impaired wife of a hospital
patient sued both the hospital and her husband's emergency room
physician for a violation of the ADA when she was unable to
communicate with the doctor and hospital staff.14  The court held
that the doctor was not liable under the ADA because he was an
independent contractor and had no power to control the hospital's
provision for interpreters.1 42
The case of Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes
Franchisee43 is not a case about franchisor liability at all. Rather,
it deals with a franchisee's challenge to the ADA as unconstitu-
tionally beyond the scope of Congressional authority.'" Of
course, Congress' authority to legislate even for single restaurants,
based upon their collective impact on interstate commerce, is
settled law.145  What is disruptive about the court's opinion,
however, is that it uses the franchisee's connection to the franchise
network and cites the volume of the franchisor's business to
135. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 704 (1996).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Telephone Interview with Robert Farr, supra note 29.
139. Id.
140. 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Plaintiff was joined in this action by the
California Association of the Deaf. Id.
141. Id. at 1332.
142. Id. at 1335. Plaintiff's additional claims against the doctor and the hospital are
beyond the focus of this Comment.
143. 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
144. Id
145. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Congressional authority to
regulate commerce rests on U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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support the franchisee's role in interstate commerce.1 6 The court
thus implicitly ties the franchisors and franchisees together without
any consideration of the control exercised in the franchise relation-
ship.
VIII. Analysis of the Equities in the Neff Decision
The Neff decision is not incompatible with decisions surveyed
in the common law and in other areas of remedial legislation. The
Fifth Circuit focused on the issue of control to determine whether
the franchisor was an operator.147 The approach seems eminently
reasonable. However, the test the court ultimately developed was
whether the franchisor had control over the architectural design of
the franchisee's business. The test would read the statute as
prohibiting discrimination by anyone who owns, leases (or leases
to), or has control over the architectural design of a public
accommodation. Viewed in this light, the test is considerably less
reasonable. If Congress had intended so narrow a focus of liability
it could have chosen this language, or many other more restrictive
substitutes than the broad term "operates."
Moreover, one could argue that franchisors "operate" a
network of franchisees. The franchisors and the franchisees
certainly have a community of interest; where the franchisee is
successful, so is the franchisor. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to
speculate that Congress was trying to reach this community of
interest.
IX. Title III Liability after Neff and a Suggestion for the
Equitable Settlement of Franchisor Liability
The ability to hold the franchisor liable for Title III compli-
ance on architectural access is important for three major reasons.
Unlike the other remedial statutes discussed above, Title III
contains the provision that modifications need not be made if they
are too difficult or unreasonably expensive."4 Expense is deter-
mined by the financial resources of the covered entity.49 If
franchisors are not held liable, franchisee assets may be low
146. Pinnock, 844 F. Supp. at 579.
147. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 704 (1996).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
149. Id.
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enough, particularly in early years of operation, to escape having
to make the modifications at all. Since the franchise industry
occupies a dominant role in precisely the areas of public accommo-
dation that Title III was intended to cover,150 widespread exercise
of the readily achievable "out clause" could severely frustrate
Congress' purpose in adopting the ADA. Moreover, a holding
affirming franchisor liability would increase the incentive of a
franchisor to negotiate for franchisee compliance. Franchisor
liability would also encourage franchisors to use greater care in
their selection of franchisees. 5  Without franchisor pressure
152
and with the protection of the "readily achievable" limitation
available, franchisees may well delay until suit or the threat of suit
forces compliance upon them.'53
The second reason that franchisor liability is important is that,
without it, persons with disabilities will have to attack noncompli-
ance on a store-by-store basis. ADQ franchises 798 restaurants in
Texas alone."t Suing even a fraction of those restaurants for
noncompliance presents a daunting task for even the most litigious
plaintiff. One could argue that, if these businesses were not
franchised, persons with disabilities would have no other option
than to sue them one-by-one. However, it may be that in choosing
to take advantage of nationwide recognition and to present
themselves to the public as related entities, franchisors and
franchisees have voluntarily accepted a responsibility toward that
150. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), "public accommodations" are defined in twelve
categories and include, briefly: privately owned hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, retail
sales stores, schools and, generally, any places providing consumer goods and services.
Among the business categories in which business format franchises concentrate are
restaurants, hotels, business services, automotive services, automotive rental services,
convenience stores, construction and home improvement, recreation and educational services,
and cleaning services. INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, FRANCHISE FACT SHEET
(1995).
151. See Greil v. Travelodge International Inc., 541 N.E.2d 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(holding the franchisor liable for a guest's, injuries suffered during robbery of a motel
franchise).
152. Any antitrust implications of franchisor pressure on franchisees to comply with the
ADA are beyond the scope of this Comment.
153. Once a complaint is filed, plaintiffs with disabilities generally have greater leverage
to reach an acceptable settlement with a franchisee than with a franchisor. To the franchisor
it may be just another lawsuit which has been brought against it. Telephone Interview with
Robert Farr, supra note 29.
154. Laws, supra note 9.
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same public. 55 The public may have a right to expect that
businesses operating under household names like Dairy Queen,
Burger King or McDonald's will comply not only with the letter of
the law, but also with the spirit behind the social policy established
by the law.'56 It may be that franchisors and franchisees cannot
have it both ways; that is, they cannot be independent of one
another for liability purposes, but linked for purposes of profit.15 7
The franchise in its present form may not be entirely compatible
with public policy. Indeed, the common law may be recognizing
that possibility in decisions like Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne
t5 8
and O'Boyle v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.'59 The inequity may
have been in allowing the franchise system to exist as something of
a legal fiction for fifty years.
The third reason for the importance of being able to hold the
franchisor under Title III is that, if Neff remains law, legal
practitioners can draft franchise agreements that can provide for
franchisor control over every operational aspect of a franchisee's
business, but may specifically and intentionally omit any control
over those aspects giving rise to ADA liability. The Neff rule is
open to abuse and appears to let private contract law dictate the
reach of federal legislation. An omission is effective to avoid
liability where an allocation of liability would not be. For these
three reasons, it appears that the rule set forth in the Neff case was
not fair and, in view of the purpose of the ADA, not desirable.
155. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cause
dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Angrand v. Key, 657 So.
2d 1146, 1149 (Fla. 1995).
156. In Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387
(5th Cir. 1977), the court noted, "[clustomers rely upon the [trademark] owner's reputation
when they select the trademarked goods." Provision of accessible accommodations to people
with disabilities should be considered when assessing the goodwill associated with a mark.
157. In 1991, the European Economic Community proposed a directive (the EEC's
equivalent of legislation) that would have provided for strict liability for the provision of
services. Malcolm Dewis, A Recent Directive Will Establish the Concept of Strict Liability for
the Provision of Services, POST MAG., June 6, 1991. While the directive focused on liability
for personal injuries and damages to property, id., it was perceived as a source of franchisor
liability for franchisees, IFA Opposes EC Liability Reg, 3 FRANCHISE LEGAL DIG. 5 (1991).
The directive was opposed by European franchise organizations as well as by the IFA. Id.
The proposal for the directive was withdrawn in 1994, Commission Withdraws Proposal on
Liability of Services, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REP., July 8, 1994, because
opposition would have robbed the directive of its substance prior to passage, id.
158. 576 So. 2d 322 (1991).
159. 435 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
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Despite the foregoing, certain equitable factors support the
contention that franchisors should not be liable under Title III, or
at least not liable at a level equal to that of franchisees. In the last
decade a type of consumer protection law has developed that is
intended to protect franchisees from unfair business practices of
franchisors.1" Such laws buttress the argument that the indepen-
dent character of franchisors and franchisees is fact, not fiction, and
makes it more difficult to view them as a collective entity. There
is also, admittedly, a certain unfairness in springing liability on
franchisors after they have negotiated their contracts, particularly
if they have no contractual power to enforce ADA compliance on
their franchisees.
16 1
One solution to the dilemma could be to hold franchisors
liable to the point of their interest in the franchised business, but
not absolutely liable for Title III compliance. If the franchisor is
found to have the necessary control over operation of the business,
the franchisor's royalty payments, rather than its net worth, could
be included in the determination whether a proposed modification
is readily achievable. This proposal has advantages over the Fifth
Circuit approach in that it limits the franchisor's exposure while
providing both franchisors and franchisees with compliance
incentives, recognizes the reality of the community of interest in the
160. For discussions of state laws regulating franchisors' relations with franchises, see
Tracey A. Nicastro, How the Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement for
Terminating a Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785 (1994); Robert W. Emerson,
Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 905 (1994); Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of State
Franchising Statute, 67 A.L.R.3d 1299 (1975); Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Fraud in
Connection with Franchise or Distributorship Relationship, 64 A.L.R.3d 6 (1975).
161. However, the lease agreements between landlords and tenants also allocate control
over the architectural design of leased structures. Regardless of this allocation, both
landlords and tenants are liable under Title III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
Although Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations recognize the allocation of responsibility
for ADA compliance between a landlord and tenant, 28 C.F.R. 36.201(b) (1994), the DOJ's
The Americans with Disabilities Act Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public
Accommodations and Commercial Facilities explains that allocation is effective only between
the landlord and tenant, not in relation to third parties. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 20.
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franchise relationship,162 and facilitates creation of the barrier-free
environment that the ADA promised to persons with disabilities.
Unfortunately, this approach has no judicial precedent in other
remedial legislation and no basis in the language or legislative
history of the ADA. Imposition of this limited liability approach
would represent profound tinkering by the judiciary with Congres-
sional legislation. It is, therefore, unlikely to be adopted.
X. Conclusion
The ADA's provisions do not solve the question of franchisor
liability for Title III. If Congress does not amend the ADA
1 63
and Neff becomes the guiding precedent of future Title III cases,
persons with disabilities will need to wait even longer for the
equality of access their representatives promised them when the
ADA was passed. Persons with disabilities can still obtain their
rightful access; they just have to sue each individual store or wait
until each decide to remodel.1" The irony is that by refusing to
162. Corporations have yet to complain or recognize publicly that, while they are
burdened with ADA compliance for businesses they operate directly, franchisors may be
benefitting from a competitive advantage in not being liable under the Act. Of course, it can
also be argued that compliance gives a franchise a competitive edge. The following story was
related by Congressman Houghton of New York during the floor debate on the ADA:
[A] restaurant in my district, because of New York law, was forced to install an
elevator to take disabled patrons to one of the three floors of the restaurant. The
proprietor resisted the mandate but finally complied. To his surprise, he found
that his business increased because of his initiative. The move helped attract the
disabled to his restaurant. In addition, word got out about the elevator and as a
result it attracted seniors and non-disabled people who did not want to walk those
stairs. Still another plus-the waiters [use the elevator] to take food to the upper
level.
136 CONG. REC. H2445 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
163. At present, there are no plans in Congress to amend the ADA. Congress intends
to allow the courts to work out the application. Telephone Interview with Bobby Silverstein,
minority counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Disability Policy (Oct. 31, 1995).
164. The undue burden defense is not applicable to alterations or new construction. 28
C.F.R. § 35.151 (1994). If a store undertakes a remodelling, it must make accommodations
for access for persons with disabilities as a part of the project. See Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9
F.3d 1067, 1071 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Hoskins v. Kinney, 114 S. Ct. 1545
(1994).
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recognize any liability on the part. of franchisors, the Neff court
may have disabled the ADA. 65
Kathleen Pearson
165. There is concern that the Fifth Circuit will be playing a disproportionate role in
developing the jurisprudence surrounding the ADA because the number of cases arising in
Texas is unparalleled in any other state. Janet Elliot, Legal Aid Runs Out of Band-Aids,
TEX. LAW., Oct. 9, 1995 at 1. Thomas D'Agostino, managing editor of the National
Disability Law Reporter, said of the case law in general, "[t]he trend is decidedly pro-
employer, despite what you see in the media about stories about people with relatively trivial
impairments using ADA to gain advantages, but in the case law so far the exact opposite is
true-courts are routinely ruling in favor of employers." Id.
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